Pu -~2.89 neutron/fis.). It entails multiplication of the initial quantity of neutrons which can continue the chain of fission. Up to now the process of forced fission has been of a damping character, the multiplication property of the system can be characterized by the multiplication coefficient M:
M=S/S source , where: S source (neutron/s) is a power of an independent neutron source; S (neutron/s) is a stabilized neutron power of the multiplication system, taking into consideration an additional inflow of neutrons due to the reaction of forced fission of nuclear fuel.
In contrast to spontaneous nuclear transformations, the intensity of which is stable and determined by the only law of radioactive decay, intensity of the reaction of forced neutron-induced fission changes, depending on the multiplication properties of a fuel-containing composition.
The index of the multiplication properties of the medium is the multiplication coefficient K ¥ characterizing the balance of neutrons in the reaction of forced fission at unlimited sizes of systems. If K ¥ ³1 -the criticality becomes possible,
i.e. reaching the level of neutrons reproducibility in the system by means of the reaction itself, sufficient for continuing forced fission of nuclear fuel without an inflow of neutrons from any other sources.
In a critical state the multiplication coefficient M=¥ and neutron power may increase unlimitedly by means of the self-supporting chain reaction of fission.
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Subcriticality reserve is generally evaluated by the value that is inverse to the multiplication coefficient -subcriticality level dK ef =1/M.
Subcriticality dK ef =1-K ef (K ef <1), where K ef -effective coefficient of neutron multiplication in the system of limited sizes.
K ef is used to characterize both subcritical (K ef <1), and supercritical systems (K ef >1). If K ef =1, then the system is in a critical state, i.e. the process of forced neutron-induced fission becomes undamping. The level of deviation of the multiplication system state from the critical state is characterized by the reactivity value r:
At the positive reactivity r > 0,5% the period of the neutron power doubling is reduced to the fractions of a second which makes the chain reaction of fission virtually uncontrollable and entails a nuclear accident with grave radioactive As for the FCM within the range K ¥ >1 (picture 1), the calculation of the critical masses parameters were performed. After the end of the active phase of the accident, a set of diagnostic measurements has been pointing out at subcriticality of all the fuel-containing materials in the Shelter object.
Quantitative indices of the multiplication coefficient obtained experimentally on the basis of special passive neutron methods, for all the FCM are less than 0.4, and on the basis of active methods -less than the sensitivity limit (0.7).
The calculations confirmed that all the FCM are in a deep subcritical state.
Various natural calamity events which cause the shifting of construction fragments of the destroyed unit (without water flooding), do not entail the appearance of critical systems.
Water can be the main factor causing the reduction of subcriticality of the FCM in the Shelter in the course of time.
Results of the 1991-1996 examinations
It should be noted that conclusions in the Feasibility Study of Nuclear Safety (FSNS) were based on the examinations carried out on the surface of fuel lava concentrations, since there was no technology for the extraction of highly active cores to penetrate into the lava. During the last few years (after the publication of FSNS) numerous experimental and computing examinations were performed for the determination of nuclear-physical, mechanical physico-chemical characteristics of the FCM related directly to the nuclear safety of the Shelter object. Below we list the most essential findings which resulted in a need for a substantial addition to the FSNS conclusions.
1)
While earlier the penetration of water into lava-like FCM was impeded by its high temperature and water resistance of the matter, now the conditions have changed. Calculations and experiments reveal considerable cooling of the lava, its cracking and transformation into water-tight structure.
2) Examination of the fuel-containing lava samples from the premises 305/2 (under the control room), carried out in 1992 -1993, showed that some samples contained AZ (active zone) fragments in a non-melted form.
Besides, visual observations showed zone fragments which were directly adjoining the lava. Thus, for calculations and assessment of the nuclear safety it is necessary to take into consideration the new composition Lava + AZF + water which is more dangerous than the Lava + water composition.
Preliminary calculations of critical parameters for such mixtures were performed in the Kurchatov Institute [2] .
Initial data:
Isotope composition of the fuel: The following data were obtained for the sphere geometry (table 3): At fuel enrichment 2% for Uranium-235 (fuel with low burning-out) the radius of critical spheres reduces two times.
Assessment calculations for analogous compositions were also performed in SSC RF PEI [6] . Previously verified complex REDUT was used as a software. Table 4 shows results of calculations of critical parameters for an equally sized cylinder (H=D) with a 50 cm. thick concrete reflector. When there is no water, the system remains deeply subcritical under any conditions. But, as it has been pointed out, in practice there are no working barriers for water inflow. Such premises include the Central Room, where dozens of tons of nuclear fuel may be under the layer of thrown-off materials, the reactor pit, the premises under the control room where the most part of the fuel lava is located.
It should be noted that until recently some abnormal phenomena were registered related to the increase in the density of a neutron flux which may have been caused by both the change in the multiplication properties of fuel massesdue to water inflow, and the increase in the instrumental error -due to the same reason. 4 . Assessment of the self-supporting chain reaction consequences on the premises of the Shelter object [5, 6] At present, the most dangerous scenario of the development of the local selfsupporting chain reaction (SCR) is connected with a fast increase of radioactivity when flooding the fuel-containing masses with water. Without protection barriers, the consequences of such an event will be irradiation of the Shelter object personnel with a powerful penetrating neutron g-radiation.
Duration of the neutron burst during the SCR -0.3 s, energy release -10 9 J, fission number -3×10
1××9
. At this number of fissions, about 4 kKi of radioactive inert gases (RIG) and radionuclides of iodine are generated. The consequences of their release into the atmosphere will be irradiation of the personnel nearby the Shelter object with up to 1 rem doses [2] .
As to the personnel working inside the Shelter object, criticality of the The exposed dose rate of a prompt g-radiation in the zone of SCR development is assessed as the value equal to ~10 6 R/s, and at the distance of 20 m ~ 300 R/s, at the same time g-doses during the SCR (0.3 s) at these points (due to prompt g-quantum) may be equal to ~10 6 rem and 100 rem, correspondingly.
As long as several hours will take to decrease the dose rate of g-radiation from fission products (formed during the SCR) from 300 R/s down to the level Ki/l) [3] .
The water is washing out the FCM, that is why, until recently, besides
Cesium and Strontium isotopes, there was a rise of concentration of alpha-active and fissionable isotopes of Uranium (up to 60 mg/l) and Plutonium (~3 kBq/l) [3] .
Presence of highly concentrated U-containing water in the reactor section of the The first stage of the work will be completed in 1998, after the final approval of the conceptual design and principal consent of the regulatory body.
Nuclear safety during the treatment of the Shelter water
In order to facilitate the designing of installations and selection of equipment, meeting the requirements of nuclear safety, scientific and research work was carried out in 1996 for the purpose of nuclear and radioactive safety during the management of water (LRW) containing fissionable materials [7] . Below is given an assessment of minimum critical and safe parameters for the most dangerous case -a mixture of Uranium dioxide of 2% enrichment with water (table 5) . Specified values of parameters will be regarded as outdated. The assessment of nuclear safety of individual equipment requires data and information on the processes parameters.
Due to the possible formation of critical masses out of new formations the calculations were carried out for the assessment of critical parameters of water composition systems on the basis of salt Na 4 UO 2 (CO 3 ) 3 . These assessments, as well as the known experimental data on criticality of other Uranium compounds,
show that minimum critical parameters of the systems with low-enrichment according to the data of critical experiments [7, 8] Assessment of the consequences of the SCR in the system consisting of new formations (salt Na 4 UO 2 (CO 3 ) 3 ) gave the following results [8] :
-the total number of fissions during the SCR is 1.6´10 19 fission;
-the total outburst of volatile radionuclides (RIG and J) is ~ 2000 Ki.
